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SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER PLEDGE AGREEMENTS
THE extent to which security law in responding to the ned of business
practice nmust reconcile conflicting commercial foirces is illustrated Iby the
doctrinal history of the pledge. Both parties to a credit transaction frequently
desire, for reasons of expense or business expediency, that the security reb
be retained by the borrower. On the other hand, third persons may demand
notice of the lender's security interest in order to guide their course uf
dealing with the debtor.' The search for a mean proves particularly difficult
when the parties avail themselves of the pledge device. Once borrower and
lender select its simple formula in order to avoid the requirements sur-
rounding such alternative devices as the chattel mortgage and conditional
sale, the courts respond to the demand of third persons for notice by com-
pelling the lender to take possession of the property as a condition precedent
1. The common law has developed no security device ex actly o:,mparable to the
Roman Law Iypotheca which arose from a debtor's possession tof the res. See St .T,
The "'Eqzitable Mortgage" in New York (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rnv. 519-20,
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to a completed pledge.2 Both contracting parties, however, press for relaxa-
tion of these possession. requirements. The resulting interaction has produced
two doctrinal responses: a fluid concept of possession by the pledgee in a
completed pledge; and a law of "non-possessory" or "equitable" pledge.
Since equitable and completed pledges lead to different legal consequences,
classification of the transaction in one or the other category is often of vital
importance to the parties. When the pledge is completed by delivery of
the res to the lender, his security interest generally is enforceable against
all the world, and upon maturity of his debt he may follow a definite col-
lection procedure against the pledged property.8 When there is insufficient
delivery and the pledge is merely equitable, however, the lender holds a
security interest enforceable only under certain conditions and one which may
be subordinated to claims of bona fide purchasers, some creditors of the
borrower, and his trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, or assignee for the benefit
of creditors.
POSSESSION IN THE COMPLETED PLEDGE
Persistent ambiguities of definition characterize the concept of possession
as the dividing line between completed and equitable pledge. So adaptable
has this term become that in most instances the lender's security interest
is sustained within the expanded pledge formula without resorting to the
law of non-possessory pledge. Although the decisions form broad categories
based upon various meanings of "possession", in many cases that concept
is significant only as a convenient fiction adopted to sustain the particular
transaction when there has been an ostensible minimum notice to third
parties of the security interest.4
When delivery of pledged goods is difficult or impossible because of their
bulky nature, the courts aid the parties to the security arrangement by
accepting various schemes of constructive deliveryu as substitutes for a
physical surrender of the res.6 In relaxing possession requirements, the
courts express an intention to protect third parties who may have relied
upon the borrower's apparent ownership of the pledged property. This policy
in the bulky goods cases requires not only that the property hypothecated
be identified and the pledgee assume control, but also that the pledgee take
2. For the sake of clarity in terminology, the noun "pledge" will be used to
indicate a security interest. The verb "pledge" will be used to designate the acts lieces-
sary to create the security interest. This terminology is suggested by RESTATE rtwr,
SECURITY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937) § 1, comment a.
3. JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITIES AND PLEDGES (3d ed. 1912) c. XVI,
4. In the last analysis it can be said that most courts using the pledge-law idiom
of "possession" and "delivery" are thinking only in terms of notice to third partie.q,
5. "Constructive delivery" is used to mean something less than a physical removal
by the pledgee. In many cases, however, the term is apparently limited to delivery
by means of title documents. See Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 399 (U. S. 1850).
6. See general discussion in RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937)
§ 6, comment a.
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further steps to notify the business world of his security interest. Although
such a standard is announced in many decisions, other courts frequently
recognize a valid constructive delivery where the acts of the parties accom-
plish little toward conveying actual notice to third persons. For example,
the initialing of goods-stamped on piled lumber1 or painted on staced
irons- and their segregation in a remote corner of the borrower's yard is
often sufficient complianceY Or storage in the borrower's distant warehouse,
where third parties are unlikely to discover the goods, may constitute a gooil
delivery. 0 This relaxation of the possession requirement is carried over into
other circumstances where the goods are more or less immobilized. Thus
liquor stored on the borrower's premises, but formally in a governmental
bonded warehouse, may be constructively delivered since manual delivery is
impossible." Although some authority exists to the contrary,'2 it seems
clear that once a court finds a constructive delivery the lender's interest
emerges as a completed pledge. But when the goods are not deemed bulky,
or the acts are held not sufficient as notice to third parties, the security
interest of the lender is reduced to an equitable pledge."
Delivery of the property to a third party as agent or bailee of the pledgee
is everywhere sufficient to perfect the lender's pledge interest.14 Although
most courts profess to uphold such arrangements only when there is an
overt assumption of possession by the third party pledgeholder,'8 frequently
the acts sustained seem to give insufficient actual notice to third parties. In
many cases the court apparently limits its inquiry to a determination of
whether or not the pledgeholder is in actual control of the res, and does not
enforce the usual publicity requirements.'0 Frequently the property is already
7. Ward v. First Nat. Bank, 202 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
S. American Pig Iron Storage Warrant Co. v. German, 126 Ala. 194, 23 So. t03
(1900).
9. See also Israel v. Woodruff, 299 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) (delivery of
"orders" for potatoes stored on three lighters, apparently with n notice to third partiet,
held sufficient); First Nat. Bank v. Harkness, 42 NV. Va. 156, 24 S. E- 548 (IF,76)
(oil delivered by instructing permanent watchman to "hold for" pledgee).
10. Grand Ave. Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 135 MIo. App. 366, 115 S. W.
1071 (1909).
11. Taney v. Penn Nat. Bank, 232 U. S. 174 (1914).
12. See language in RESTATE=IENT. SEcURTYv (Tent Draft No. 1, 1937) §6. com-
ment a, at pp. 21-22.
13. Sequeira v. Collins, 153 Cal. 426, 95 Pac. 876 (190S).
14. JoNEs, COLLATERAL SEcunrnrrs AND PLEDGS (3d ed. 1912) § 10. Where the
third party is a dummy corporation, however, no pledge interest is created. Hamilt.mn
Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
15. Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68 F. (2d) E64, 256 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934).
16. Manufacturers' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Gilman, 7 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 1;t,
1925) (delivery of marine engines to borrower's general manager as pledgeholder);
First Nat. Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1S96).
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in the possession of a warehouseman or carrier,1 7 and where a document
of title is involved some opinions regard the pledge as complete without
notification to the holder that a security interest exists.18 There is important
statutory modification, however, since both the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act require notice of the pledge to the
carrier or warehouseman before the security interest of the lender is com-
plete. 19 Prior to such notification, the lender appears to be an equitable
pledgee, although his status in this situation seems to have no relation to
the usual requirement for protecting third parties: apparent ownership in
the equitable pledgor.
As applied in the much used field-warehousing arrangement, the pledge-
holder device presents the small manufacturer or dealer with a ready source
of cheap operating credit.20 Institutionally, the warehouse company isolates
a quantity of goods in a leased portion of the borrower's plant, marks the
segregated items and part of the building as in its possession, chooses an
employee of the borrower to act as its agent, and issues warehouse receipts
to the borrower.21 The latter then pledges the receipts to a bank or to its
materialmen in order to obtain credit. The goods, however, are left upon
the borrower's premises, easily available for processing, exhibition, or sale,
when released by the pledgee. In a transaction of such informality, the line
between perfected and equitable pledge is necessarily difficult to draw. How
far borrower and lender may go toward rendering the agreement a mere
formality that gives no notice to third parties is "a question of more or
less"'2 2 and the subject of much litigation. Factors usually considered by
the courts are whether or not there is a locked enclosure, who pays the
agent's salary, whether a formal lease exists, whether the borrower substi-
tutes freely, and whether there are sufficient signs both inside and outside
17. If the res is already in the possession of the pledgee, as collateral security for
another loan, or for another purpose, no additional delivery is required to create a
pledge. Ingram v. Mandler, 56 F. (2d) 994 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) ; JoNis, COLLA'rI3AL
SECURITIES AND PLEnDGES (3d ed. 1912) §§ 25, 36.
18. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384 (U. S. 1850); Bank of Newport v. Hirseh,
59 Ark. 225, 27 S. W. 74 (1894).
19. UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcIPrs ACT § 42; UNIFoRm BILLS OF LADING ACT § 33.
20. Field-warehousing seems to be favored by many banks as a security device
for a broad area of commercial activity. See Miller, Field-Warehousing (Feb. 1941) 35
MID-WESTERN BANKER 9; Tuttle, New Borrowers Made Eligible For Loans To Fihunce
Operations (1940) 57 BANKERS MONTHLY 554.
21. See general discussion in (1931) 19 CALIF. L. REv. 333. There is a well
established maxim that a party cannot be his own warehouseman. See Mechanics
Trust Co. v. Dandridge, 18 Ky. L. REP. 625, 37 S. W. 288 (1896).
22. "Whether enough has been done to give a right of any kind in certain property
is a question of more or less." Justice Holmes in Sexton v. Kessler & Co., Ltd.,
225 U. S. 90, 98 (1912).
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of the building.23 An apparently sympathetic judiciary refrains from estab-
lishing a single confining formula.
Other commercial necessities lead to further changes in traditional pledge
concepts of possession and delivery. In many cases where there is a proper
initial surrender of the pledged property, the parties desire its return to
the pledgor for the performance of a specified undertaking. Again responding
to the actualities of business many courts hold that a return of the res for
a temporary and limited purpose does not destroy the security interest
of the lender 24 except as against a bona fide purchaser from the pledgor. -7'
MWhile this doctrine is applied particularly to the return of pledged notes
for renewal or collection,26 and to the return of chattels for sale or process-
ing2 the rule is stated generally to include all limited returns benefiting
the pledgee's interest or the security res. But if the returned goods are
mixed with the pledgor's general property,2 or returned unconditionally to
him, 29 the security interest of the lender becomes an equitable pledge until
timely repossession. Although few of the opinions show a detailed inquiry
into the duration of the special return,3 0 it is apparent that the permissible
time may vary from a few days for collection of a note to many months
for liquidation of a large block of securities.3 ' In cases where the property
23. Pittman v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 118 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A.
6th, 1941); McCaffey Canning Co., Inc. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415,
294 Pac. 45 (1930) ; Philadelphia Warehouse Co. v. Winchester, 156 Fed. CO0 (C. C. D.
Del. 1907).
24. RESTATEMT, SE CURI (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937) § 11(2). A pledge is not
destroyed by the pledgor's wrongful repossession. American Pig Iron Storage Warrant
Co. v. German, 126 Ala. 194, 28 So. 603 (1900).
25. A bona fide purchaser from the pledgor in possession defeats the lender's
security interest. Schumann v. Bank of California, 114 Ore. 336, 233 Pac. 860 (1925) ;
Atlanta Guano Co. v. Hunt, 100 Tenn. S9, 42 S. V. 4,R2 (1897). But cf. Clare v.
Agerter, 47 Kan. 604, 28 Pac. 694 (1S92) (bona fide mortgagee). A purchaser with
notice, however, takes subject to the pledge. Stocky-ards Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank,
249 Fed. 421 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
26. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 202 N. C. 604, 163 S. E. 676 (1932); Ains-
worth v. Kruger, 80 Mont. 468, 260 Pac. 1055 (1927) (pledgor held as "trustee" during
special return).
27. S. J. Marx Co.'s Trustee v. Marx, 223 Ky. 339, 3 S. W. (2d) 644 (1928);
Darragh v. Elliotte, 215 Fed. 340 (C. C.A. 6th, 1914).
28. Sneeden v. Nurnberger's Market, 192 N. C. 439, 135 S. E. 328 (1924). In
many of these special return cases, the pledgor executes a trust receipt. Most c ,urts,
however, merely apply conventional rules governing special returns and do not permit
the trust receipt to change the legal result. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank
v. New Orleans, T. & f. Ry. Co., 161 La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926).
29. In. re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 22 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
30. White & Williams v. Platt, 5 Denio 269 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 184S), is a typical case.
31. The pledgee's possession for seven months has been held a proper limited
return where a large number of notes were to be collected. Williams v. Hall, 30 Ariz.
581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926).
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is to be returned immediately, and for a substantial length of time, original
delivery seems little more than a doctrinal rite.
32
Since the limited return cases presuppose a completed pledge, the pledgee
prevails over all creditors of the pledgor, prior or subsequent to the return.
When an attaching creditor of the pledgor defeats the lender in the case
of an attempted limited return, the pledge has been held equitable not because
of the apparent ownership doctrine but because the terms of the return give
the borrower too general a dominion over the res.3 3 In protecting bona fide
purchasers, however, the courts recognize the irrelevancy of the purpose of
the return as a deterrent to third party reliance on apparent possession and
subordinate the pledgee's claim. While the reason for the difference in treat-
ment accorded bona fide purchasers and creditors presumably rests on the
unexpressed premise that possession does not remain in the borrower for a
period long enough to mislead creditors, the usual judicial indifference to
the time element casts doubt upon the validity of this assumption. By the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act,34 however, lien creditors are allowed to defeat
the interest of the pledgee in the special return cases after ten days. Although
this provision is consistent with the strict security-law tradition of protecting
creditors of the borrower, such a short period necessarily will curtail the
commercial flexibility of the pledge device and its adoption may be expected
to drive many of the transactions now treated as special returns into the
equitable pledge class.
A number of complications in terminology arise from the hypothecation
of choses in action, since there is some reluctance to apply the term pledge
to such an assignment.3 The trend, however, is toward labelling the trans-
action a pledge when the chose in action is represented by an "indispensable
instrument" - a document possession of which is necessary to enjoyment
of the right.36 Assignments of book accounts or other intangibles, incapable
of being exclusively represented by a single document, have on the other
hand also been classified as pledges.
37
32. Professor Hanna suggests dispensing with original delivery in this case. Hanna,
Trust Receipts (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 545, 553-54.
33. A few opinions seem to disregard the commercial function of the special purpose
doctrine in allowing even an unlimited return to a pledgor as "agent", "custodian", or
"bailee" of the lender. These courts, however, reach the opposite decision if the
pledgor is merely in "possession". Rose v. Coble, 61 N. C. 517 (1868). The Restate-
ment group accepts the same distinction. RESTATEMENT, SECUITY, EXPLANATORY NO TF.
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937) p. 82.
34. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 3(3).
35. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) ; In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co.,
122 F. (2d) 606 (C. C.A. 3d, 1941).
36. This term is suggested in RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937)
§ 1, comment e.
37. Savage Tire Sales Co. v. Stuart, 61 Mont. 524, 203 Pac. 364 (1921) ; American
Exch. Nat. Bank v. Fed. Nat. Bank, 226 Pa. 483, 75 Atl. 683 (1910).
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Both groups of assignments of choses in action pose delivery problems.
When the chose is represented by a so-called indispensable instrument, such
as a bond, or insurance policy, some opinions recognize manual delivery of
the document as sufficient to create a pledge interest in the recipient. In
most cases, however, the physical handing over must be supplemented I y
a written assignment,30 power of attorney,"0 or indorsement; 1 and, in the
case of stock shares and insurance policies, by registration upon the hooks
of the issuing company.Y The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, for example,
permits manual delivery of an indorsed certificate, but stipulates that an
unindorsed certificate must be accompanied by a power of attorney. 3 Insuffi-
cient delivery forces these transactions into the equitable pledge category.
When the pledged chose in action is, like book accounts, not represented
by an indispensable instrument, the courts abandon the idiom of possession
and delivery; the manner in which the borrower deals with the pledged chose
in action is the measure of the lender's security interest.4 4 Hence, whln
accounts receivable are assigned4 5 the important consideration is not the type
of delivery, although a minimum surrender of account books or a written
assignment is usually required as an indication of intent, but whether or not
the borrower treats the accounts assigned as if he recognized the dominant
security interest of the lender. And where the pledgor exercises full dominion
over the accounts, using the proceeds generally in his business, this "un-
fettered use" conclusively imputes fraud to the transaction and dissolves the
pledge. 4G Once such an arrangement is termed fraudulent, the lender is stripped
of even an equitable pledge interest. But collections by the debtor as agent
for the pledgee or other acts of limited jurisdiction are held compatible with
a recognition of the creditor's security interest.47 Compliance with the un-
38. Stout v. Yaeger Milling Co., 13 Fed. R02 (C C. E. D. Mo. 1882) (insurance
policy); Taft v. Bowker, 132 Mass. 277 (1882) (savings bank b,k); see c.,rpo.ratv
stock gift cases collected in BALLAN-ri.NE, CoRutJRATION LW' A PR , rcIcE (2d ci.
1930) § 146, n. 18.
39. The older authorities are collected in JonEs. COLLATMRAL S ermUTs AnD,
PLEDGES (3d ed. 1912) §§ 142, 145, 152.
40. See Nisbit v. Macon Bank & Trust Co., 12 Fed. jS6, b00 (C. C. S. D. Ga. I'2 .
41. See Crowder . Terhorst, 107 Ind. App. 28, 21 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).
42. See general discussion in BALLANTINE, ConrorAioN L.w AND Pm~crTcl (2d
ed. 1930) § 147 and cases cited.
43. UNIFoa.A STOcK TRANsFE AcT § 1. The indorsement must be in blank &cr
to a specified person.
44. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PaREFE:cEs (rev. ed. 1940)
§§ 531-33.
45. This security device is common in factoring arrangements. See Danziger
and Steffen, The Rebfrth Of The Commercial Factor k1936) 36 4,'.L L Rn'. 745,
754-65.
46. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925).
47. See discussion in Miller, An Assgnment of Accounts Rccciz'atde as a Sccurity
Dcvicc (1937) 22 MAR9. L. REv. 28, 29-30.
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fetfered use test established in Benedict v. Ratner4s apparently gives the
pledgee a claim superior to that of an attaching or levying creditor, and in
most jurisdictions one superior to the rights of a subsequent assignee.4
0
THE NON-POSSESSORY OR EQUITABLE PLEDGE
When a court declines to extend the elastic concept of possession in the
pledgee to a particular fact situation, the security interest held by the lender
against the borrower becomes an equitable pledge.50 By definition, possession
fails only when there is no notice to third parties of the lender's security
interest. Factually, an equitable pledge most frequently arises when for
reasons of business convenience the debtor remains in control of the pledged
property and the circumstances do not fall within the constructive delivery,
bulky goods, or special return categories. But apart from the situation in
which parties seeking to create an immediate pledge fail to meet delivery
requirements, equitable pledges arise in other types of transactions. An
attempted hypothecation of property not owned by the borrower, or not yet
in existence, will create a non-possessory pledge interest in the lender as
soon as it is acquired or produced. 5' Moreover, the pledge interest is equit-
able when a security contract stipulates the future pledging of a particular
chattel or chose in action.5 2 On the whole, these and a few other trans-
actions5 3 produce the bulk of equitable pledge litigation.
In many of the debtor-in-possession cases, however, the courts face a
categorization problem, since the surrounding circumstances and the am-
biguous phraseology of the agreement frequently suggest that either a pledge
or a chattel mortgage might have been intended by the parties. Traditionally,
48. 268 U. S. 353 (1925).
49. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924). it
the case of a second assignment, however, a few courts adhere to the English rule
of Dearle v. Hall [3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1823)] that the first, assignee notifying the debtor
perfects his security interest. American authority for this English view is collected
in GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) § 527, n. 40.
50. On the general problem, see RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1937) § 10; Glenn, The "Equitable Pledge", Creditors' Rights, and the Chandler Act
(1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 422; Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 621.
51. Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 213 U. S. 126 (1909) (pledge of unniined
coal); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. RFC, 120 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) (pledge
of pig iron prior to manufacture).
52. National Bank of Commerce v. Moody, 90 S. W. (2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935); Bogard v. Tyler's Adm'r, 119 Ky. 637, 55 S.W. 709 (1900).
53. Frequently a contractor offers the owner or surety all raw material and equip-
ment located upon the particular job as security for his completion of the contract
work. Subsequent insolvency of the contractor often finds these parties holding an
incomplete security interest. In re P. J. Sullivan Co., Inc., 254 Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918). An incomplete security interest is also produced by returned goods in the
pledged accounts receivable cases. Goldstein v. Rusch, 56 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932).
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the distinction is based upon a formalism: whether title passes to the lender.
Whien title does pass by the agreement, the lender's interest is held a chattel
mortgage, but it is termed a pledge when a merely "special" property is
conveyed.54 Unless the parties indicate which security device they intend,
explicitly or by clear implication from the nature of their agreement, classi-
fication by intent exposes judicial intuition to a severe test.
The security interest arising from an incomplete contract of pledge is
commonly designated an "equitable lien" or "equitable interest" in the res.",
Historically it was enforced by the chancellor. And because of its origin
in equity the interest of the pledgee out of possession was not recognized
in suits at law by many early American courts, even as between the con-
tracting parties.5 7 On the other hand, some contemporary courts have ignored
not only its equitable origins but also its equitable terminology, and decide
the particular case by determining which party is entitled to possession of
the hypothecated property.'5 Other courts, maintaining that the pledge is
based upon possession, enforce the lender's security interest by means of
the tortuous fiction that possession lies where the contract has placed it, at
least as between the parties to the agreement.69
Ostensibly the equitable pledge must attach to an identified res as desig-
nated by the parties at the time of their contract,", but this rule is seldom
strictly applied. Where, for example, a certain number of securities or notes
are pledged as collateral, the identification requirement is often ignored.
Without destroying the interest of the equitable pledgee, a pledgor-bank
often retains and exercises a right of substitution and replacement over the
54. For discussion on a completely verbal level, see (1932) 7 NorrE DAM L,%WVLP
230; see also In re German Publication Society, 289 Fed. 509, 510 (S. D. N. Y. 192.
("the whole matter floats nebulously in that fog, 'the intent of the parties,' out of
which the courts are so apt to evoke what they most %,.ant:)
55. The attitude of the late Justice Holmes seems a m,,del in judicial methl.
Maintaining that a court should construe the conduct of the parties as adorpting what-
ever device, consistent with the facts, was best fitted to accomplish the desired results,
he was willing to assume that any correct verbal formula had been empluyed. Seton
v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1912).
56. Such terminology is used by most courts. Julhns,,n v. Burke Manor Bldg.
Corp., 48 F. (2d) 1031, 1034 (C. C.A. 7th, 1931): James Freeman Brown Co. v.
Harris, 88 S. C. 558, 560, 70 S. E. 802, 803 (1911). See generally 4 port!.,v, Ewsiv
JuRIsPRUDEzNcE (5th ed. 1941) §§ 1233-37; Britton. Equitable Liens- Ten tative
Analysis of the Problem (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 388.
57. Mforganstein Y. Commercial Nat. Bank, 125 Ill. App. 397 (19t); Yt ung v.
Kimball, 59 N. H. 446 (1879).
58. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilskm, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928); Murdock v. Murdock, 300 Pa. 2,0. 150 Atl. 599 (1930).
59. Nobles v. Christian & Craft Groc. Co., 113 Ala. 220, 20 So. 9G1 (IS%);
see Jo Fs, COLLATERAL SECURITIES tN PLEDG-E (3d ed. 1912) §28.
60. In re ,lagrill, 22 F. (2d) 757 (C. C.A. 5th, 1927); see In re Herkimer Mills
Co., Inc., 39 F. (2d) 625, 628 (N. D. X.Y. 1930).
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collateral segregated as security for governmental deposits' 1 or for loans
from other banks. 62 A similar relaxation occurs when the borrower pledges
fungible goods. Under such circumstances the pledgor is permitted to make
substitutions without destroying the lender's interest. 3 The Uniform Sales
Act adopts this policy by permitting a vendee's interest to become affixed
to a specified quantity of fungible goods.0 4 Many courts, however, adhere
strictly to the identification requirement, upon the theory that an in rei
right to possession demands an identified res. But in these jurisdictions if
the description is sufficiently vague, the security interest of the non-possessory
pledgee may attach to an entire body of goods.0 5 Upon occasion a court
may employ various conceptual aids in order to reach an equitable decision
and yet formally preserve the identification requirement. For example,
where a pledgor by his own wrongdoing intermixes the res with other goods
so that ascertainment becomes impossible, the court may preserve the equit-
able lien as between the parties by estopping the borrower from denying
that any particular goods were intended to be pledged. 0
In awarding possession of the res to the equitable pledgee seeking to
perfect his security interest by suit against the borrower, the courts appear
to be applying the traditional equitable remedy of specific performance.07
But instead of treating the cases in the light of that doctrine, most opinions
merely repeat the maxim "equity regards as done that which ought to be
done."0 8 But in the minority of courts, which frankly label their decree one
for specific performance, it is bottomed on the inadequacy of the legal
remedy. 0 When an equitable pledgee attempts to perfect his right to pos-
session of the res prior to maturity of his claim, the possessory decree is
based upon the fact that damages at law are nominal and therefore inade-
quate.70 After maturity, and where the debtor is insolvent the decree has
been granted, absent bankruptcy, because damages collectible are necessarily
61. Burroves v. Nimocks, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C. C.A. 4th, 1929).
62. Chapman v. Johnson, 261 S. W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
63. See RESTATEMENT, SEcUIuTY, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937)
p. 66.
64. UNrom SALS AcT § 6(2).
65. Hopkins v. National Shawmut Bank, 293 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923), cerl,
denied sub nor. Eventually v. Equitable Trust Co., 263 U. S. 722 (1924).
66. Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146, 27 N. E. 24 (1891).
67. For a statement that the decree is not one of specific performance, see Glenn,
The "Equitable Pledge", Creditors' Rights, and the Chandler Act (1939) 25 VA. L.
REv. 422, 424.
68. This theory has received its clearest statement in 4 PomEloy, EqurrY JUms-
PRuDENcE (5th ed. 1941) § 1235; see Hook v. Ayers, 80 Fed. 978, 982 (C. C. A. 7th,
1897).
69. See 4 PommoY, op. cit. supra note 68, § 1401 et seq.
70. See RESTATEmENT, SEcUpiTY, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937)
p. 75.
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inadequate. 71 Another theory supporting recovery of the hypothecated prop-
erty by the equitable pledgee, apparently distinct from specific performance,
is premised upon the doctrine that a court of equity will not countenance
an unjust enrichment on the part of a borrower attempting to retain posses-
sion of the res.'"- Whichever principle of enforcement is applied, the courts
in the equitable pledge cases have shown a high degree of freedom from
doctrinal rigidities.
The types of claims held by third parties, however, present the crucial
problems on enforceability of equitable pledges. The interest of the equitable
pledgee is everywhere valid against the borrower 3 and the fact that third
parties exist who have extended credit in reliance upon the apparent owner-
ship of the pledgor in possession is usually regarded as irrelevant in an
action between the parties to the security contract. But where the equitable
pledgee faces a general creditor with a matured claim, the courts occupy the
position of referee in a race for possession between the lender, attempting
to perfect his security interest, and the creditor, seeking a lien by attach-
ment or levy.74 A bona fide purchaser for value from the equitable pledgor,
however, obtains the res free of the lender's security interest.Z On the other
hand, a purchaser with actual notice of the interest of the equitable pledgee,
or with notice of facts calling for reasonable inquiry, takes subject to his
claim.76 While the effect of notice upon creditors has rarely been litigatcd,
there is some authority that in this situation the creditor's claim will be
subordinated to the interest of the pledgee.77 But in general the opinions
do not examine the basis for credit extension and the usual common law
rule seems a presumption that all third parties have relied upon the equitable
pledgor's possession of the res. Moreover, the courts are not uniform in
their holdings where the pledgor undergoes insolvency administration with
the hypothecated property among the apparent assets of the estate. If a
clash of possessory rights occurs between the equitable pledgee and a receiver
71. Sullivan v. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch. 59 (1847). Where the debt.0r is nwt in,.veilt,
after maturity the decree is based upon the inadequacy of damages cmputcd upun the
future ability of the borrower to repay and upon a future value for the prpcrty. 11id.
72. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVaANcEs AND PREFER cLs (rev. ed. 1940)
§§ 522-23.
73. National Bank of Commerce v. Moody, 90 S. W. (2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935).
74. People's Bank v. Continental Supply Co., 213 Ky. 44, a0 S. W. 458 ,192,;
Gamson v. Pritchard, 210 Mass. 296, 96 N. E. 715 (1911); Parshall v. Eggert, 54
N. Y. 18 (1873).
75. Robertson v. Wade, 17 Tenn. App. 457, 6S S. NI. (2d) 487 (1933) (bona
fide mortgagee); Mosher V. Smith, 67 Me. 172 (1877).
76. Murry v. Central Bank, 226 Mo. App. 400, 40 S. A. (2d) 721 (1931).
77. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNvEYANCES AND PrEanme.cs (rev. ed. 1940) § 2)'2d.
For the effect of statutory notice from an inscription upon a document of title, Fce
Taplinger v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 101 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), ozcrridiik,
In re Fell, 16 F. Supp. 987 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
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or assignee for the benefit of creditors, the lender gains the res only in the
rare case where the court equates the interest of the insolvency officer with
that of the borrower and subjects it to the same equities.78 Most courts,
however, regard the assignee or receiver as holding the insolvent's estate for
the benefit of all creditors. Having rights superior to those of the equitable
pledgor, he thus prevails over the pledgee.79
Much of the equitable pledge litigation arises in the federal courts during
bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization. Prior to the Chandler Act of
1938, when the parties contracted to pledge before the four-month prefer-
ence period but perfected the agreement within that time, a majority of
bankruptcy courts refused to find a preference, even though the trustee
represented intermediate general creditors who had relied upon the bor-
rower's apparent ownership.80 To preserve the pledgee's equitable lien these
courts adopted the fiction that delivery related back to the origin of the
agreement.8 ' Although a substantial number of courts refused to apply
the relation back rationale,8 2 it was frequently employed not only in the
equitable pledge cases, but also in the equitable lien cases in general83
When the equitable pledgee failed to take possession before adjudication,
however, most cases awarded the res to the trustee as part of the debtor's
estate, relying upon the 1910 amendment 84 which armed him with the rights
of an attaching or levying creditor. 85 The trustee was unable to use this
amendment in combatting the relation back doctrine since it apparently con-
ferred no rights upon him prior to adjudication. Moreover, since the trustee's
title was not perfected until adjudication, prior to 1938 creditors had little
protection during the period between the filing of the petition and adjudi-
cation.86
78. Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146, 27 N. E. 24 (1891) (assignee)
Chapman v. Johnson, 261 S. IV. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (receiver) semble.
79. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467 (1877) (receiver); Copeland v. Barnes, 147
Mass. 388, 18 N. E. 65 (1888) (assignee).
80. Johnson v. Burke Manor Bldg. Corp., 48 F. (2d) 1031 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931)
Massachusetts Trust Co. v. MacPherson, 1 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
81. The cases are collected in 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (Moore's ed. 1941) § 60.37,
n. 51. This fiction was also adopted when federal jurisdiction was invoked tnder the
National Banking Act. REv. STAT. § 5242 (1875), 12 U.S. C. § 91 (1934), Burrowes
v. Nimocks, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
82. The authorities are reviewed in In re New York & Baltimore Inland Trausp.
Co., 276 Fed. 145, 150-51 (D. Del. 1921), aff'd sub norm. Hayes v. Gibson, 279 Fed,
812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert. denied, 259 U. S. 581 (1922).
83. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905) (chattel mortgage on after-
acquired property).
84. As re-enacted into the Chandler Act, the 1910 amendment is found in 52 STAT.
881 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 110(c) (Supp. 1939).
85. See generally 4 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1935) § 1547.
86. See discussion in Glenn, The "Equitable Pledge", Creditors' Rights, and the
Chandler Act (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 422, 438.
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Inspired by critics of this "chaotic jumble", the Chandler Act amendment
to Section 60 clearly aimed at destroying the concept of relation back as
a means of circumventing preference rulesS, The simple prophylactic adopted
is the dating of the transfer either as of the time when it is so far perfected
that no bona fide purchaser can acquire further rights from the debtor,
or, if not so perfected, then immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
The various preference elements must be ascertained as of this time.63 More-
over, the trustee's title to the bankruptcy estate is now dated as of the
filing of the petition.89 Although eventually the amendment may end the
era of secret liens in bankruptcy, many courts have not construed the new
section to achieve the results intended by its drafters. One fundamental
misconception is embodied in a number of recent decisions declining to treat
the transfer as one for an antecedent debt when the transaction is perfected
at some time subsequent to its inception and within the four-month preference
period. 0
While the simplicity of the pledge device preserves it from detailed
legislative control, a few special statutes are aimed at the non-possessory
arrangement. By Section 3 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the equitable
pledge is validated for ten days against all creditors, with or without notice,
to the extent that the lender gives new value under the security contract.
But purchasers for value and without notice continue under the Act to gain
a right in the res superior to the security interest of the equitable pledgee
even within the ten-day period. Section 230 of the New York Lien La,
designed for the protection of banks in their extensive brokers' day loan
transactions, validates non-possessory pledges and unrecorded mortgages or
liens for a single day, if the property consists of stocks or bonds. But the
broad language of Section 230 has recently been held to include all pledges,
mortgages, or liens upon stocks or bonds.01 In general, however, the rules
surrounding the completed and equitable pledge are developed exclusively
in the case law.
PROTECTION OF CREDITORS
Over the entire field of security law no consistent policy for the protection
of the borrower's creditors from an incomplete security interest exists in
either statute or case law. Within a single jurisdiction whether lien credi-
87. The leading criticism of old Section 60 is found in 'McLaughlin, lncz:dincit of
the Bankruptcy Act (1927) 40 HAnv. L. REv. 341, 387-90.
88. For a complete discussion, see 3 CoLman, BA.nxKRurTCy (.Mlore's ed. 1941)
§ 60.38.
89. 52 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U.S. C. § 110(a) (Supp. 1939).
90. Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U. S. 699 (1941). For a strong condemnation of the!v decisii,n, c
3 CoLaN. op. cit. supra note 88, § 60.39 at pp. 911-16.
91. Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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tors, all creditors, or no creditors will be protected under local recording
acts or case law may depend upon the type of security device used.92 Al-
though in the pledge situation only attaching or levying creditors of the
borrower prevail over the security interest of the equitable pledgee, frequent
dicta add confusion by suggesting that the facts are examined to discover
if creditors actually relied upon the apparent ownership of the borrower,0 3
as if such reliance were a prerequisite to a favorable decision. 4 The problem
of what classes of creditors should be protected and what remedy they
should be afforded seems merely a particular aspect of a general need for
an orderly collection procedure when the debtor does not undergo insolvency
administration. While federal bankruptcy law is designed to distribute the
debtor's assets under. judicial supervision insuring fairness to both secured
and unsecured creditors, there is no adequate formula when the debtor
avoids a formal insolvency proceeding. But since most of the equitable
pledge cases involving the interests of third parties are decided during a
bankruptcy administration of the debtor's estate, the private collection cases
have only a secondary importance. Moreover, if there is undue depletion
of the debtor's assets by private collection the debtor may be forced into
bankruptcy, and recent attachments or perfections of security interests may
be vulnerable as preferences or fraudulent conveyances. But in spite of the
relative infrequency of private collection, the conflict between an equitable
pledgee and a single general creditor seems to bear reexamination in the
light of a need for reform in private collection procedure.0 ,
In formulating a policy for the protection of creditors dealing with the
equitable pledgor, the courts are faced with the double problem of choosing
which creditors are to be protected and what type of remedy is to be offered
92. In New York, for example, the interest of the lender upon an cquitable
mortgage of land is good against all creditors of the mortgagor, in the absence of
bad faith or collusion. See Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York (1920)
20 COL. L. REv. 519, 523, n. 20. But the security interest of the equitable chattel
mortgagee is subordinate to the claims of mere general creditors in existence during the
period of the non-recordation. The state cases are reviewed in In re Shay's Estate,
157 Misc. 615, 285 N. Y. S. 379 (Surr. Ct. 1935). When pledge or conditional Sale devices
are used, however, only the lien creditor is protected. Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484,
166 N. E. 175 (1929) (conditional sale).
93. See Swetnam v. Edmund Wright Ginsberg Corp., 37 F. Supp. 546, 550
(S. D. N. Y. 1941); In re Smith-Flynn Comm. Co., 292 Fed. 465, 472 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923).
94. Most opinions, however, presume that third parties were deceived in their
credit transactions. See Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467 (1877) ; Gretzinger v. Arehart,
193 N. E. 714 (Ind. 1935).
95. For a suggested reform in the collection procedure for general creditors, see
Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1055. Based upon
a policy of preventing the burdening of a debtor beyond his ability to pay, this plan
allows creditors to share in the debtor's property in the order in which credit has
been extended.
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them. At the outset it is clear that the security interest of the equitable
pledgee cannot be upheld against all creditors, since the foundation of
pledge law rests on the premise that possession 1y the lender is deceptive to
third parties.90 But the other extreme - protecting all bona fide creditors
of the pledgor - might prove a sound solution. If all creditors are protected,
it is possible to provide a more substantial remedy than the common law
race of diligence. For if the courts are to penalize secret liens, it would
seem that a substantial sanction should be employed against the holder as
a preventive measure; and more important, that the relief granted the
creditor should be something adequately recompensing him for his loss from
the deception. A more positive policy against secret liens would thus arll
to the security of general credit extensions.
In constructing a stronger policy against secret liens the legislature could
establish a reasonable time for the taking of possession, during which the
pledge interest of the lender could be perfected. Upon its termination,
presuming reliance by third parties, the statute would dissolve his security
interest. Although the strongest sanction against the equitable pledgee in
this situation involves subordination of his debt to claims of creditors, such
a penalty seems unnecessarily harsh. By preserving his underlying debt and
reducing him to the status of a general creditor, the lender would he per-
mitted to employ customary collection methods, without, however, any ad-
vantage from his unperfected security interest. r Although in enforcing his
claim the demoted equitable pledgee would again be involved in a race for
possession with other general creditors, he would compete upon an even
basis by using court process upon maturity of his debt. Adoption of a
fixed possession time would also protect all creditors of a debtor under-
going local or federal insolvency administration, since the asset would become
a part of the estate if the specified period had passed.
Apparently no state at present offers as strong a remedy to creditors as
the statutory period for possession. The operation of any such plan, how-
ever, would not seem to threaten serious impairment to the commercial
utility of the pledge device since the current flexibility of the possession
concept validates the great majority of transactions as completed pledges.
Moreover, under this liberality in imputing possession to the pledgee, it
would seem reasonable to demand strict compliance with the remaining simple
and easy procedures. 98 And in those cases where an equitable pledge has
96. The generalization against secret liens had an early expressicn in Twyne's
Case [3 Co. 80b (K. B. 1602)] where a vendor's retention of plisses ir n was held t.
constitute a "badge of fraud" voiding a sales transaction.
97. This is roughly the theory of the New York chattel mortgage rec.,rdivg act.
N. Y LrMX LAw § 230.
98. Such an argument is outlined in REST.rEMENT, SECURITY (Tent. Draft XN,. 1,
1937) § 10, comment b at p. 32.
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proved inevitable, the parties could be expected to use some other form
of security.
While the common law method of collection presents obvious adminis-
trative advantages, on the whole it would seem inadequate as a solution to
the security law policy of protecting third parties. Furthermore, the race
of diligence between equitable pledgee and general creditor is consistent
with traditional common law policies to allow a debtor to dispose of his
own assets until prevented by a lien or by insolvency administration, and
to force general creditors into a race of diligence as between themselves.
But as a remedy it offers only the right to vie for possession of the res
with an equitable pledgee who holds a security interest by definition secret
and often enforceable without the cumbersome and expensive court action
required of the general creditor. Furthermore, even this remedy is available
only to the creditor with a matured claim. 90 In general, the common law
collection procedure seems to fail both in substantially recompensing credi-
tors and in sufficiently penalizing secret liens.
Between the extremes of statutory possession time on the one hand and
the common law collection process on the other lies an examination of the
basis for credit extension in order to isolate the particular group of creditors
actually injured by the secret lien, with a view to providing those parties
with a stronger remedy. Clearly the usual judicial policy of offering equal
protection to all creditors can be no more valid than its premise- that all
credit is extended by relying upon the chattels and choses in action that
comprise a portion of the debtor's property. Actually, however, credit is
not extended so simply. Account is taken of the reports of general and
special credit agencies, information from informal exchanges and from credit
interchange bureaus, the debtor's statements, business references, and per-
sonal acquaintance. 0 0 The assumption of many opinions that the creditor
walks through the debtor's establishment and extends his credit upon the
basis of visible assets in finished goods and raw materials is clearly an over-
simplification. And since many general credit transactions are based upon
something other than assets of the debtor capable of being pledged, it seems
reasonable for the courts to protect only those third parties actually deceived
by the particular secret lien. Although proof of reliance by such "estoppel
creditors" necessarily would be difficult, they might be required to establish
the bases used in extending credit, and, so far as possible, the extent of their
reliance. In administering such a plan, however, it would be necessary to
avoid decisions based upon an incomplete causation theory since many of
99. See Hensley v. Minehan, 29 Ga. App. 251, 114 S. E. 647 (1922) (attachment
not issued until debt matured).
100. For general discussion, see CHAPIN, CREDIT AND COLLECTION PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (3d ed. 1939) Pt. II; BECKMAN, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS IN TIIEORY AND
PRACTICE" (3d ed. 1938) Pt. II.
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the factors prompting credit extension at some point depend upon the assets
of the debtor.' 01 While perhaps not insuperable, these problems of proof
stand as major objections to adoption of the "estoppel creditor" scheme of
protection.
Under such a plan, those third parties who extended credit in reliance
upon the borrower's apparent ownership might be given a right in the res
superior to the security interest of the equitable pledgee. Administratively,
allowance could be made for intervention by creditors in a possessory actilin
by the lender, with a right to recover the property from the equitable pledgee
in the original cause. Moreover, if the debt of the relying creditor is not
matured, the property might be held in custody of the court until the time
when the rights concerned could be fixed.'02 Again it is clear, however,
that procedural complications under this system would be greater than under
the present collection process, or under the proposed statute creating a
possession time. On the whole it would seem that either the "estoppel
creditor" or the common law theories are inferior to the statutory period
as a solution, since the latter protects all third parties without promising
serious interference with business uses of the pledge as a security device.
CONCLUSION
By repeatedly refusing to recognize a static conception of possession
in the lender, the courts render the pledge device fully adaptable to the
business needs of the contracting parties. Although frequently an arrange-
ment is held a completed pledge when it is at least doubtful that the sur-
rounding conditions offer adequate notice to third persons, the chief need
for reform arises when there is admittedly no warning of the lender's security
interest. Under these circumstances where the claim of the general creditor
and the security interest of the lender are before the court, it appears that
at least some - and perhaps all - creditors might be accorded more positive
preference over the equitable pledgee than they can obtain through a common
law race of diligence. The slight extent to which such a rule would curtail
the commercial usefulness of the pledge seems more than offset by the added
security given general credit transactions. Although a strong sanction in
effect means the end of the equitable pledge, it seems but a reasonable ex-
tension of the present policy of lending protection to third parties who rely
upon the apparent ownership of the equitable pledgor.
101. This problem is discussed in Comment (1925) 34 Y.%Lu L J. 091, RS9-1.
102. Most of the administrative problems are similar to the mt in Sturge', .1
Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1055.
1942]
